Super-reação de curto prazo em ETFs de ações após retornos extremos em um dia by Lobão, Júlio & Costa, Ana Isabel
ISSN 1808-057X
DOI: 10.1590/1808-057x201807630
Original Article
Short-term overreaction in equity ETFs following extreme 
one-day returns
Júlio Lobão¹
 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5896-9648
Email: jlobao@fep.up.pt
Ana Isabel Costa¹
 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8118-3157
Email: anaisabelvcosta@gmail.com
¹ Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia, Departamento de Finanças, Porto, Portugal
Received on 02.26.2018 – Desk acceptance on 05.11.2018 – 1st version approved on 07.05.2018 – Ahead of print on 03.25.2019
Associate Editor: Fernanda Finotti Cordeiro Perobelli
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the short-term price predictability of US equity Exchange Trade Funds (ETFs) in reaction to one-day 
extreme returns. We also assess the cross-section features associated to price overreaction following extreme price movements. 
The literature on the short-term overreaction of ETFs is rather scarce. Furthermore, existing studies tend to focus on delimited 
historical periods, which makes their results difficult to generalize. Our paper fills this gap by considering a comprehensive 
sample of ETFs over an extended period of time. In addition, we are the first to study the effect of the prevailing market 
trend and of liquidity on the patterns of overreaction and subsequent price reversal of ETFs. Being the major ETFs the 
most actively traded equity securities on the US stock exchanges, their performance and characteristics are of interest by 
themselves. Our findings suggest that market regulators should concentrate their resources on overseeing the ETF pricing 
that occurs after-hours. For market practitioners, our results indicate the existence of profitable market opportunities after 
large price movements. In the present study, we tested the significance of the mean returns for the period immediately after 
extreme returns. We also conducted a multivariate analysis where the price reversal was regressed against the cross section 
features of the ETFs under study. We contribute to the literature on ETF price formation as we document, for the first time, 
the existence of a stark contrast in the reaction to extreme price movements in these assets during normal hours and after-
hours periods. On average, the extreme returns that occur in the after-hours period represent an overreaction, leading to a 
price reversal in the following period. In addition, we show that both tax-motivated trading and noise trading play a role in 
the pattern of ETF overreaction and reversal.
Keywords: equity ETFs, overreaction, short-term reversal, normal hours - after-hours return, price predictability.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The creation of Exchange Trade Funds (ETFs) is one 
of the most spectacular successes in financial innovation 
in the last decades. Today, the major ETFs are the 
most actively traded equity securities on the US stock 
exchanges. The US ETF market remains the largest in 
the world, accounting for more than 70 percent of ETF 
assets worldwide. Data from the Investment Company 
Institute show that by February 2017, 1,736 ETFs were 
listed in the US for assets worth $1.73 trillion. These 
numbers attest to the widespread demand for ETFs by 
market participants. For retail investors seeking to gain 
exposure to broad market indexes, particular sectors or 
geographical regions, ETFs are a convenient, cost-effective 
tool. And institutional investors, including mutual funds 
and pension funds, use ETFs to invest in markets, manage 
investor flows, or hedge their exposures.
Since ETFs have become such an important investment 
vehicle in terms of both trading volume and dollar value 
outstanding, their performance and characteristics are of 
interest by themselves. In this paper, we conduct the most 
comprehensive investigation to date about the response to 
the changes in the price of ETFs that occur within both 
normal trading hours and after-hours (more than +5% 
or less than -5%). Using an extensive sample of 36,962 
extreme price changes of US ETFs over the 2007-2014 
period, we compare the normal hours returns (‘open-
to-close’) and after-hours returns (‘close-to-open’) for a 
group of 847 equity ETFs. We also segment the sample 
by ETF type and conduct a cross-sectional analysis to 
understand which factors may account for the existence of 
under/overreaction following extreme price movements.
We document a stark contrast between what occurs in 
normal hours and after-hours. On average, only extreme 
returns that occur after-hours represent an overreaction, 
causing a reversal in the subsequent period. This result 
supports the proposition that normal and after-hours 
periods may be regarded as two distinct markets and 
suggests that markets during after-hours tend to be 
significantly more inefficient. Based on multivariate 
analyses, we show that the magnitude of the reversal 
tends to be conditional on the size of the previous extreme 
return. Moreover, our findings suggest that both tax-
motivated trading and noise trading play a role in the 
pattern of ETF overreaction and reversal. The implications 
of our results to both regulators and market practitioners 
are addressed in conclusions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. 
We review the related literature in the second section. 
The third section describes the data and methods. The 
empirical results are presented and discussed in the fourth 
section. The final section provides a conclusion.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
A considerable body of empirical literature exists on 
the overreaction of prices after large price increases and 
declines. Using a sample of stocks listed on the NYSE, 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) showed that stocks that had 
registered the lowest returns over the previous three or 
five years did better during the following three to five 
years than those that had previously had the highest 
positive returns. A contrarian strategy would yield an 
annual abnormal market adjusted return of 24.6% for 
the arbitrage portfolio.
Inspired by that study for long-run stock returns, 
other authors document short-term market overreaction 
after large one-day price changes. For example, using 
US daily data from 1975 to 1984, Atkins and Dyl (1990) 
showed that stock prices overreacted in the short-term, 
especially to negative information. Stocks that experience 
a one-day price increase (or decline) of more than 10% 
display abnormally negative (or positive) returns the 
next trading day.
Bremer and Sweeney (1991), Cox and Peterson (1994), 
and Choi and Jayaraman (2009) offer corroborating 
evidence for the US market. For the period between 
1962 and 1986, Bremer and Sweeney (1991) examined 
stock returns of firms listed in the Fortune 500 that show 
price declines of more than 10% in a day and also found 
strong price reversals in the days after the drop. The first 
day shows a return of 1.77% above average and rises 
cumulatively to 2.23% over the two days after the price 
shock.
Cox and Peterson (1994) studied large one-day stock 
price decreases (a return of -10% or lower) and subsequent 
returns over a twenty-day period. They partitioned their 
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sample period (1963 to 1991) into five-year intervals to 
analyze stock price overreaction over time. The authors 
found significant reversals of price decreases, too, but 
only for the period before 1987. Cox and Peterson 
(1994) conclude that price reversals in short-term can 
be explained by the bid-ask bounce and by the degree 
of market liquidity, and that overreaction vanishes with 
rising market liquidity.
Choi and Jayaraman (2009) analyzed the 1996-2004 
period for the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ and found 
overreaction patterns up to two days after a large price 
decline (at least 10%), but only for nonoptional stocks.
Outside the US, there are also studies on short-term 
overreaction. For example, Bremer, Hiraki, and Sweeney 
(1997) examined daily returns of stocks included in the 
NIKKEI 300 index and found price reversals after large 
one-day stock price drops. And Bowman and Iverson 
(1998) and Otchere and Chan (2003) concluded that 
short-term overreaction did exist in New Zealand and 
Hong Kong, respectively.
More recently, Spyrou, Kassimatis, and Galariotis  (2007) 
and Mazouz, Joseph and Joulmer  (2009) found results for 
the UK that seem to contradict the overreaction hypothesis. 
Spyrou et al. (2007) report that the market reaction to shocks 
for large capitalization stock portfolios in the 1989-2004 
period was consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. 
Mazouz et al. (2009) found no evidence of overreaction 
to large one-day price changes except following negative 
shocks of very large magnitude (more than 15%).
Lobe and Rieks (2011) document evidence of 
overreaction in the German stock market between 1988 
and 2007 for stocks experiencing a price change of 10% 
or more in either direction. However, due to transaction 
costs, the effect can hardly be exploited.
On the contrary, Caporale, Gil-Alana, and Plastun 
(2017) show that short-term overreactions in various 
financial markets (stock markets, foreign exchange 
markets, commodity markets) cause the emergence of 
temporary market inefficiencies that could result in extra 
profit opportunities.
The literature on ETFs’ overreaction is rather limited. 
Madura and Richie (2004) showed that US ETFs during 
the dot-com bubble were prone to intraday overreaction 
and reversal which could be profitably exploited by 
contrarian day-traders. They found greater overreaction 
in ETFs that were more volatile and in international 
ETFs. Similarly, Simon and Sternberg (2005) concluded 
that German, UK and French equity ETFs trademarked 
by “iShares” overreacted to market developments after 
European markets closed, and Tse and Martinez (2007) 
argued that noise traders created excessive volatility in 
the price of 24 iShares funds traded in the US from 2002 
through 2004. Finally, Levy and Lieberman (2013) used 
intraday data to conclude that ETF returns during non-
synchronized trading hours (i.e., when the underlying 
markets and US markets have no overlapping trading 
hours) express a behavioral bias where traders overreact 
to local US market sentiment.
Overall, the literature indicates that overreaction is 
generally found after extreme one-day returns, being 
especially significant following price decreases. For the 
studies dealing with profitability issues, most studies 
suggest that no abnormal returns could have been 
obtained in-sample.
3. DATA AND METHODS
Our sample comprises observations of daily opening 
and closing prices for all the NYSE-traded equity ETFs 
between January 2007 and December 2014. Daily price 
data covering the 847 ETFs were obtained from the 
Bloomberg database.
Daytime returns are estimated as the log difference 
between the closing and opening prices on day t. Overnight 
returns are the log difference between the opening price 
on day t and the closing price on day t−1. Daytime period 
and overnight period jointly cover a total of twenty-four 
hours.
Based on Madura and Richie (2004), the sample is 
further partitioned by ETF type. ETFs can be classified as 
sector, broad-based, or international, and enable investors 
to gain exposure to different segments of the market. 
Broad-based ETFs like the iShares Dow Jones US Total 
Market Index Fund or the SPDR allow the investor to 
cover US equities with a single ETF. Sector funds like the 
Barclays iShares Dow Jones Sector allow investment in the 
stocks of different industrial sectors. Finally, international 
ETFs like the iShares MSCI Germany Index Fund allow 
investors to achieve exposure to international markets. 
Our sample includes 285 broad-based ETF, 329 sector 
ETF and 233 international ETF.
For a one-day period, the trigger to qualify for a 
sample in other analysis of individual stocks is usually 
a daily absolute return of 10% or higher (e.g., Cox & 
Paterson, 1994; Choi & Jayaraman, 2009). Since ETFs track 
a combination of stocks and should not be as volatile as 
single stocks, we adopt a minimum trigger of 5%.
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The number of extreme price increases (winners) and 
decreases (losers) across normal and after-hours periods 
by different types of ETFs are shown in Table 1 (Panel 
A). The entire sample includes 36,062 extreme ETF price 
changes that meet the minimum 5% trigger level. A total 
of 22,596 (62.66%) observations qualify during normal 
hours versus 13,466 (37.44%) after-hours. As Panel B 
shows, of the entire sample, 18,952 (52.55%) are losers, 
and the remaining 17,110 (47.45%) are winners. In all ETF 
types considered, the number of losers is higher than the 
number of winners. Our data also indicate that most of 
extreme price variations refer to the sector ETFs. Panel B 
of Table 1 shows that 47% of the 22,596 movements during 
normal hours and that 39% of the 13,466 movements 
during after-hours can be attributed to sector ETFs.
The ratio of normal hours observations versus after-
hours varies by ETF type. The normal hours observations 
dominate for broad-based ETFs and for sector ETFs but in 
international ETFs the number of after-hours observations 
is higher.
Table 1
Distribution of equity ETF sample that meets the 5% minimum trigger level
Panel A: Distribution of winners and losers across normal hours and after-hours
Winners
(positive triggers)
Losers
(negative triggers) Total
Normal hours After-hours Normal hours After-hours
International ETF 1,774 20% 2,308 26% 2,458 28% 2,259 26% 8,799 100%
Broad-Based ETF 3,565 31% 1,904 17% 4,165 36% 1,787 16% 11,421 100%
Sector ETF 4,750 30% 2,809 18% 5,884 37% 2,399 15% 15,842 100%
Entire Sample 10,089 28% 7,021 19% 12,507 35% 6,445 18% 36,062 100%
Panel B: Distribution of subsamples across types of ETF
Total normal hours Total after-hours Total winners Total losers
International ETF 4,232 19% 4,567 34% 4,082 24% 4,717 25%
Broad-Based ETF 7,730 34% 3,691 27% 5,469 32% 5,952 31%
Sector ETF 10,634 47% 5,208 39% 7,559 44% 8,283 44%
Entire Sample 22,596 100% 13,466 100% 17,110 100% 18,952 100%
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Following Brown and Warner (1980), we employ a 
mean-adjusted returns model to analyze the occurrence 
of overreaction occurring after a large price variation. 
Expected returns are computed using a 255-day estimation 
window that ends fifteen days before the event.
We apply the testing framework of Madura and Richie 
(2004) to our dataset. Thus, the time horizon used to test 
for a reversal is either the after-hours period following 
prior extreme price variations during normal trading 
hours, or the normal hours subsequent to extreme price 
movements observed during the previous after-hours 
period.
We conducted a cross-sectional analysis to understand 
which factors may account for the occurrence of 
overreaction following extreme price movements. We 
considered the abnormal returns in reaction to extreme 
price movements to be conditional on the following 
characteristics: 1) the period under analysis (normal 
hours versus after-hours); 2) the size of the extreme return 
(trigger) of the ETF; 3) the type of ETF; 4) the volatility 
of the ETF; 5) the trading volume of the ETF; 6) the 
prevailing trend (bullish versus bearish) in the stock 
market; and 7) the existence of tax effects.
An extreme price variation is classified according to 
whether it occurred in normal hours or after-hours with 
a binary variable. One should expect a larger overreaction 
after-hours since the literature suggest that prices on this 
period are less efficient (e.g., Barclay & Hendershot, 2003; 
Berkman, Koch, Tuttle, & Zhang, 2012).
The trigger is assessed as the return that allowed the 
ETF to qualify for the sample based on the +5% or -5% 
threshold level. We expect that a more extreme price 
movement may mean a greater overreaction, thus leading 
to a larger reversal.
Each ETF is categorized as international, broad-based, 
or sector. The three kinds of ETFs are classified in separate 
using binary variables standing for sector ETFs and 
international ETFs. It is plausible to admit that different 
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ETF types may exhibit different sensitivities to pricing 
factors. For example, broad-based ETFs are expected to 
be subject to lower levels of overreaction because they 
represent a broadly diversified holding of US stocks.
ETF volatility is captured by the abnormal standard 
deviation of returns over the past ninety days. The 
abnormal standard deviation of returns is computed as 
the difference between the standard deviation of returns 
observed over the past ninety days before the trigger 
day and the standard deviation of returns in the 255-
day estimation window ending fifteen days before the 
event. The expected relationship between overreaction 
and volatility is not clear. In fact, while Brown, Harlow, 
and Tinic (1993) report a positive correlation between 
abnormal post-extreme price movement returns and shifts 
in return volatility, it is also plausible to conjecture that 
the presence of noise traders in the market – proxied by 
a heightened volatility in prices – may drive informed 
investors off the market, thus mitigating the magnitude 
of short-term price reversals.
An ETF’s liquidity is measured as the abnormal 
daily trading volume for the period in which the trigger 
happened. The abnormal daily trading volume is defined 
as the difference between the trading volume observed in 
the trigger day and the average daily volume of trading in 
the 255-day estimation period ending fifteen days prior 
to the event. According to Cox and Peterson (1994), 
more liquid ETFs should be less prone to mispricing (and 
therefore to overreaction) because a sufficient number of 
informed investors is involved.
We applied the method proposed by Pagan and 
Sossounov (2003) to capture the prevailing trend (bullish 
versus bearish) in the US stock market, represented by 
the S&P500 index. The literature suggests that prices may 
be more susceptible to temporary mispricing when the 
market sentiment typical of bullish trends is higher (e.g., 
Stambaugh et al., 2012). Moreover, Davis, Madura, and 
Marciniak (2009), in an analysis of the performance of 
US ETFs during the 2007-2009 crisis, suggest that the 
degree of overreaction in ETF prices was associated with 
the price runnup preceding the financial crisis.
The reaction to an extreme return may be partially 
explained by tax reasons. Thus, a binary variable was 
used to classify extreme price movements according 
to whether they occurred in December or January. De 
Bondt and Thaler (1987) show that price reversals have 
a very strong seasonal pattern: significant price reversals 
associated with loser stocks occur only in January. This 
suggests that tax loss selling may play a role especially 
on loser reversals.
Finally, year dummies were used to account for 
unobservable time-specific factors.
We employ the following multivariate model to all 
winners and losers to test for the impact of the trading 
period (normal versus after-hours) while controlling for 
a set of other variables:
where:
AR = abnormal return during the period following the 
extreme return,
AFTERHOURS = the binary variable, with a value of 1 if 
the return occurs after-hours and 0 otherwise,
TRIGGER = return of the ETF (must be >+5% or <-5%),
INTLDUM = the binary variable, with a value of 1 if the 
ETF is an international fund and 0 otherwise,
SECTDUM = the binary variable, with a value of 1 if the 
ETF is a sector fund and 0 otherwise,
ABN_VOLATILITY = the abnormal standard deviation 
of returns observed over the past ninety days before the 
extreme return occurs,
ABN_VOLUME = abnormal volume of shares trading 
in the trigger day,
BULLDUM = the binary variable, with a value of 1 if the 
stock market is in a bullish trend when the extreme price 
movement occurs and 0 otherwise,
TAXDUM = the binary variable, with a value of 1 if the 
extreme return occurs during December or January and 
0 otherwise, and
YEAR08, YEAR09, YEAR10, YEAR11, YEAR12, YEAR13 
and YEAR14 = binary variables, with a value of 1 if the 
extreme return occurs in the year 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013 or 2014, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
The model was tested for heteroscedasticity and 
corrected using White’s test.
We also adapted the model to examine the cross-
sectional variation in abnormal returns for the normal 
hours and after-hours in separate. In this case, the 
 
AR� �  �� � ��AFTERHOURS� � ��TRIGGER� �  ��INTLDUM� � ��SECTDUM�
� ��ABN_VOLATILITY� �   ��ABN_VOLUME� �  ��BULLDUM�
� ��TAXDUM� � �� YEAR0� �  ��� YEAR0� � ��� YEAR10 
� ��� YEAR11 � ��� YEAR1� � ��� YEAR1� �  ��� YEAR1� �  �� 
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AFTERHOURS variable is excluded, being replaced by 
the binary variable LOSDUM, to distinguish losers from 
winners. LOSDUM is assigned a value of 1 if the extreme 
return is negative and 0 otherwise.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Abnormal Returns Subsequent to the 
Extreme Price Movements of ETFs
Table 2 shows the abnormal returns in the sequence 
of after-hours triggers that occurred for the full sample of 
winners and losers and the different subsamples. For the 
winners and losers, the results are displayed for trigger 
levels of at least 5%, at least 6%, and at least 7%.
As shown in Table 2, the after-hours winners undergo 
a significant negative return in normal hours, regardless 
of the trigger level. At least 57% experienced negative 
abnormal returns in normal hours. The reversal in normal 
hours suggests that the extreme returns that happened 
after-hours reflect an overreaction. It is noteworthy, in 
the last two columns of table 2, that between one quarter 
and one third of the mean extreme price movement of 
winners is overturned for the subsamples subdivided by 
different minimum trigger levels. In general, a significant 
reaction comes after an extreme price movement occurred 
after-hours. This suggests that some investors that trade 
in normal hours take advantage on the overreaction that 
happened overnight.
Although most of the reversal is concentrated on the 
normal hours period following the after-hours period 
where the extreme return occurred, it is interesting to 
notice that abnormal returns continue to be significantly 
negative in the subsequent after-hours period. This 
indicates that the reversal movement in normal hours 
was not incorrect, and thus seems to verify that the initial 
extreme price variation was in fact an overreaction.
The magnitude of the reversal in normal hours, 
during the subsequent after-hours period, and over the 
combination of these two periods, is larger when a higher 
trigger level is used. For example, the ETFs that meets the 
minimum +5% trigger have a mean abnormal return of 
-1.73% in  normal hours, while the ETFs that meet the 
minimum 7% trigger level experience a mean abnormal 
return of -3.38%. Comparable results hold for the twenty-
four-hour period following the after-hours period when 
the extreme return was observed.
Table 2
Whole sample of abnormal returns after after-hours triggers
After-hours Normal hours After-hours 24 hours Continuation (+) or 
reversal (-) in the 
following period 
in proportion 
to the initial 
extreme return
Continuation (+) 
or reversal (-) in 
the following 24 
hours in proportion 
to the initial 
extreme return
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period 1-2)
Panel A. Winners (positive triggers)
Trigger level
>=5% 7.50% -1.73% -0.07% -1.80% -23.09% -24.02%
(N = 7021) (78.20)*** (-14.00)*** (2.60)*** (-23.60)***
100%:0% 43%:57% 46%:54%
>=6% 8.75% -2.46% -0.05% -2.50% -28.05% -28.60%
(N = 4388) (62.76)*** (-13.53)*** (2.86)*** (-38.23)***
100%:0% 39%:61% 46%:54%
>=7% 9.97% -3.38% -0.01% -3.38% -33.86% -33.92%
(N = 2888) (51.38)*** (-13.44)*** (2.92)*** (-10.77)***
100%:0% 35%:65% 46%:54%
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After-hours Normal hours After-hours 24 hours Continuation (+) or 
reversal (-) in the 
following period 
in proportion 
to the initial 
extreme return
Continuation (+) 
or reversal (-) in 
the following 24 
hours in proportion 
to the initial 
extreme return
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period 1-2)
Panel B. Losers (negative triggers)
Trigger level
<=-5% -7.53% 1.41% 0.44% 1.85% -18.80% -24.64%
(N = 6445) (-68.89)*** (16.70)*** (7.36)*** (20.64)***
0%:100% 69%:31% 28%:72%
<=-6% -8.94% 1.94% 0.52% 2.46% -21.72% -27.53%
(N = 3827) (-53.81)*** (15.31)*** (6.27)*** (17.80)***
0%:100% 62%:38% 54%:46%
<=-7% -10.32% 2.67% 0.56% 3.23% -25.85% -31.26%
(N = 2437) (-43.33)*** (14.62)*** (5.21)*** (37.18)***
0%:100% 65%:35% 54%:46%
Notes: Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics.
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using a 1-tailed test for significance.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Table 2 also shows that the after-hours losers undergo 
a statistically significant reversal in normal hours for 
all trigger levels. While the proportion of positive and 
negative observations vary with the minimum trigger 
level used, at least 62% experienced positive abnormal 
returns in normal hours period. These results suggest 
that the market overreacted in the case of after-hours 
loser ETFs. As with after-hours winners, most of the 
positive reversal is concentrated on the normal hours 
period and abnormal returns continue to be positive in 
the after-hours period that follows the trigger event. This 
seems to verify that the initial extreme price movement 
was in fact an overreaction.
As with winners, the magnitude of the reversal for 
losers after-hours is larger when the losers qualify for 
the higher trigger level (larger loss). Similar results hold 
for the twenty-four-hour period in the sequence of the 
after-hours period when the extreme return was observed.
The reversal tends to be more pronounced in the 
following period for after-hours winners than after-hours 
losers. However, in a 24-hour period the differences in 
the size of reversal are negligible.
Table 3 depicts the abnormal returns following extreme 
price variations of ETFs that occurred during normal 
hours for the full sample of winners and losers and the 
various subsamples. The contrast with the results obtained 
previously is stark. Normal hours winners experience not 
a reversal but a continuation after-hours. This tendency is 
common to both extreme winners and losers, regardless 
of the trigger level.
About 50% of extreme positive price variations 
(winners) experience negative return on the following 
after-hours period. It is meaningful that the abnormal 
returns become negative in the following normal hours 
period (period 2). This suggests that the continuation 
which occurred after-hours was wrong and that the 
investors that operate in this period did not realize that 
the initial movement corresponded to an overreaction 
in prices. In spite of the correction observed in period 
2, only between 4.17% and 7.31% of the initial extreme 
movement is offset in the first 24 hours.
The size of the reversal in normal hours and in the first 
24 hours after the extreme return is more pronounced 
for larger triggers.
As with winners, about half of negative extreme price 
variations (losers) experience positive abnormal returns 
on the following period. The reversal in the first 24 hours 
is bigger when a larger trigger level is used. However, 
the larger the trigger level, the smaller the correction in 
percentage of the initial extreme return. The size of such 
reversal in the first 24 hours varies between 6.78% and 
8.44% of the initial movement.
Table 2
Cont.
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Overall, we observe significant differences on responses 
to extreme price movements between normal hours and 
after-hours periods. While normal hours extreme price 
movements do not experience, on average, any reversion 
on the following period, after-hours extreme abnormal 
returns show, for the following period, a significant mean 
reversion of -1.73% for winners and 1.41% for losers, 
considering a trigger of 5%.
Table 3
Full sample abnormal returns after normal hours triggers
Normal hours After-hours Normal hours 24 hours
Continuation (+) or 
reversal (-) in the 
following period 
in proportion 
to the initial 
extreme return
Continuation (+) 
or reversal (-) in 
the following 24 
hours in proportion 
to the initial 
extreme returnPeriod 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period 1-2)
Panel A.  Winners (positive triggers)
Trigger level
>=5% 7.67% 0.28% -0.60% -0.32%
3.70% -4.17%
(N = 10089) (95.82)*** (7.34)*** (-3.28)*** (-6.36)***
100%:0% 50%:50% 47%:53%
>=6% 8.91% 0.33% -0.84% -0.51%
3.72% -5.75%
(N = 6212) (75.94)*** (6.47)*** (-3.04)*** (-18.14)***
100%:0% 50%:50% 46%:54%
>=7% 10.10% 0.33% -1.07% -0.74%
3.28% -7.31%
(N = 4049) (61.57)*** (5.41)*** (-2.66)*** (11.52)***
100%:0% 49%:51% 44%:56%
Panel B. Losers (negative triggers)
Trigger level
<=-5% -7.47% -0.03% 0.66% 0.63%
0.46% -8.44%
(N = 12507) (-95.20)*** (3.94)*** (13.25)*** (8.58)***
0%:100% 52%:48% 58%:42%
<=-6% -8.70% -0.11% 0.77% 0.65%
1.29% -7.50%
(N = 8057) (-75.91)*** (3.28)*** (11.37)*** (-2.44)**
0%:100% 51%:49% 59%:41%
<=-7% -9.93% -0.19% 0.86% 0.67%
1.90% -6.78%
(N = 5391) (-61.82)*** (2.78)*** (9.76)*** (28.25)***
0%:100% 50%:50% 59%:41%
Notes: Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics.
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using a 1-tailed test for significance.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Table 4 compares the size of reversal and continuation between the normal hours and after-hours periods.
Table 4
Test of difference in mean abnormal returns
Trigger level AR after normal hours trigger AR after after-hours trigger Mean difference t-stat.
5% winner 0.28% -1.73% 2.01% (23.42)***
6% winner 0.33% -2.46% 2.79% (22.15)***
7% winner 0.33% -3.38% 3.71% (20.96)***
5% loser -0.03% 1.41% -1.45% (-10.71)***
6% loser -0.11% 1.94% -2.05% (-10.07)***
7% loser -0.19% 2.67% -2.86% (-10.03)***
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test for significance.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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For normal hours winners meeting the 5% minimum 
trigger level, the mean continuation after-hours is 0.28%, 
while for after-hours winners, there is a reversal in 
the following period of -1.73% on average. The mean 
difference between the two types of reactions is 2.01%, 
which is statistically different from zero. The results are 
similar for the 6% and 7% trigger levels.
For normal hours losers that qualify for the 5% trigger, 
the continuation after-hours is of -0.03%; for after-hours 
losers, there is a reversal in the following period of 1.41% 
on average. The mean difference between the two types of 
reactions is -1.45%, which is again statistically different 
from zero at conventional levels. The results are similar 
for the 6% and 7% trigger levels.
Thus, the returns observed suggest that there was a 
significant difference in the reaction in the two different 
periods. This supports the assertion that normal and after-
hours periods may be regarded as two distinct markets.
Since results may differ by ETF type, the analysis is 
replicated for each type in Table 5 and Table 6. The 5% 
trigger is used again here. Table 5 shows the reaction 
of ETFs after an initial extreme return occurred during 
normal hours, while Table 6 shows the results observed 
after an extreme return that took place after-hours.
Table 5
Abnormal returns after an extreme price movement during normal hours for ETF types
Hours 24 hours Continuation (+) or 
reversal (-) in the 
following period 
in proportion 
to the initial 
extreme return
Continuation (+) 
or reversal (-) in 
the following 24 
hours in proportion 
to the initial 
extreme return
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 (Period 1-2)
Winners (positive triggers)
ETF type
International ETF
(N = 1774)
7.44% -0.07% -0.59%
-0.66%
(-4.77)***
-0.98% -8.87%
(39.00)*** (-0.46) (-6.21)***
100%:0% 46%:54% 47%:53%
Broad-Based ETF
(N = 3565)
7.53% 0.41% -0.58%
-0.17%
(-2.42)**
5.47% -2.20%
(55.95)*** (5.01)*** (-8.69)***
100%:0% 50%:50% 49%:51%
Sector ETF
(N = 4750)
7.87% 0.32% -0.63%
-0.31%
(-4.25)***
4.07% -3.93%
(67.35)*** (4.54)*** (-10.77)***
100%:0% 51%:49% 46%:54%
Losers (negative triggers)
ETF type
International ETF
(N = 2458)
-7.21% 0.23% 0.54%
0.77%
(4.81)***
-3.18% -10.65%
(-40.67)*** (2.39)** (4.23)***
0%:100% 54%:46% 59%:41%
Broad-Based ETF
(N = 4165)
-7.51% -0.30% 0.68%
0.39%
(2.62)***
3.96% -5.13%
(-55.29)*** (-3.55)*** (7.43)***
0%:100% 51%:49% 58%:42%
Sector ETF
(N = 5884)
-7.55% 0.04% 0.70%
0.75%
(7.19)***
-0.56% -9.88%
(-66.00)*** (0.89) (9.15)***
0%:100% 52%:48% 57%:43%
Note: Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics.
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using a 1-tailed test for significance.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Table 6
Abnormal returns after an extreme price movement during after-hours for ETF types
Hours 24 hours Continuation (+) or 
reversal (-) in the 
following period 
in proportion 
to the initial 
extreme return
Continuation 
(+) or reversal
(-) in the following 
24 hours in 
proportion 
to the initial 
extreme return
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
(Period
1-2)
Winners (positive triggers)
ETF type
International ETF
(N = 2308)
7.34% -0.91% -0.27%
-1.18%
(-9.15)***
-12.41% -16.11%(43.92)*** (-8.41)*** (-3.96)***
100%:0% 48%:52% 45%:55%
Broad-Based ETF
(N = 1904)
7.53% -1.76% -0.07%
-1.83%
(-12.50)**
-23.35% -24.33%(40.91)*** (-14.88)*** (-1.81)*
100%:0% 43%:57% 45%:55%
Sector ETF
(N = 2809)
7.60% -2.39% 0.10%
-2.29%
(-18.73)**
-31.39% -30.08%(50.14)*** (-24.59)*** (-0.30)
100%:0% 39%:61% 47%:53%
Losers (negative triggers)
ETF type
International ETF
(N = 2259)
-7.32% 0.76% 0.48%
1.24%
(7.93)**
-10.34% -16.96%(-39.61)*** (7.20)*** (3.52)***
0%:100% 56%:44% 58%:42%
Broad-Based ETF
(N = 1787)
-7.49% 1.49% 0.41%
1.90%
(11.15)**
-19.91% -25.36%(-36.08)*** (12.48)*** (2.46)**
0%:100% 60%:40% 53%:47%
Sector ETF
(N = 2399)
-7.75% 1.98% 0.42%
2.40%
(16.52)**
-25.52% -30.94%(-43.33)*** (19.13)*** (2.97)***
0%:100% 63%:37% 53%:47%
Note: Proportion of positive observations: proportion of negative observations shown in italics.
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using a 1-tailed test for significance.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
From Table 5, it is possible to conclude that in most 
cases the after-hours returns represent a continuation 
of the extreme returns occurred during normal hours 
periods. The only statistically significant exception is 
the reversal of international ETF losers. All types of ETF 
winners in the normal hours period do not experience a 
significant reversal after-hours, but they do experience a 
significant reversal in the subsequent normal hours period. 
These findings are consistent with those described for the 
full sample. Regarding the response in the 24-hour period 
subsequent to the extreme price variation, the reversal 
of normal hours winners is weaker than the reversal 
of normal hours losers. In the same 24-hour period, 
international ETFs present the most pronounced reversal.
Table 5 and Table 6 also highlight the stark contrast 
between the response to extreme returns observed in 
normal hours and after-hours. The mean reversal following 
after-hours winners and losers is statistically significant for 
all ETF types, although that reversal is stronger for winners 
than losers. These results are also consistent with those 
obtained with the full sample. Sector ETFs experience the 
strongest reversal both in the following period and in the 
24-hour period after the extreme return. International 
ETFs experience the least pronounced reversal in those 
two periods.
Differences of mean reversals after extreme price 
movements by types of ETF are summarized on Table 
7. We compare the reversals by ETF type within the 
separate subsamples of day winners, day losers, after-
hours winners, and after-hours losers. The 5% trigger 
level is used again to identify the ETFs to be considered 
in each sample.
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Table 7
Comparison of abnormal returns by type of ETF
Panel A. Summary of abnormal returns by type after a 5% trigger
International ETF Sector ETF Broad-Based ETF
Normal hours winners -0.07% 0.32% 0.41%
Normal hours losers 0.23% 0.04% -0.30%
After-hours winners -0.91% -2.39% -1.76%
After-hours losers 0.76% 1.98% 1.49%
Panel B. Differences of abnormal return
AR intl - AR sector AR intl - AR broad AR sector - AR broad
Normal hours winners
-0.55% -0.58% -0.03%
(-3.41)*** (-4.01)*** (-1.04)
Normal hours losers
0.23% 0.52% 0.28%
(1.06) (3.09)*** (1.80)*
After-hours winners
1.71% 0.54% -0.89%
(10.37)*** (3.17)*** (-6.18)***
After-hours losers
-1.31% -0.45% 0.92%
(-8.56)*** (-3.24)*** (5.09)***
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively considering a 2-tailed test for significance.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Panel A of Table 7 summarizes the continuation/
reversals (as measured by abnormal returns), while Panel 
B shows two-way comparisons. Regarding normal hours 
periods, international ETFs are the only ones where there 
is a reversal after-hours. Panel B shows that international 
and broad-based ETFs experience the greatest difference 
in their mean reversals. For normal hours losers, there is a 
significant difference between the response of international 
ETFs (that exhibit a return reversal) and the response of 
broad-based ETFs (that exhibit a return continuation).
For after-hours periods, the largest differences are 
observed between international and sector ETFs, followed 
by the differences between sector and broad-based ETFs. 
For after-hours winners and after-hours losers, the reversal 
of sector and broad-based ETFs is significantly more 
pronounced than for international ETFs.
Overall, results suggest that, in normal hours periods, 
international ETFs are the only type that experience an 
overreaction, leading to a correction after-hours. Sector 
ETFs exhibit a greater degree of overreaction after-hours, 
which entails a more pronounced reversal in the following 
period.
4.2 Multivariate Analysis of ETF Winners and 
Losers
Table 8 and Table 9 show the results of the multivariate 
analyses of ETF winners and losers. Table 8 shows results 
for the full sample. All regressions are globally significant 
with a 1% significance level. For winner ETFs, the 
AFTERHOURS binary variable is significantly negative, 
which indicates that the reversal after an after-hours 
winner is more pronounced than the reversal following 
a normal hours winner. This result is consistent with the 
earlier finding that, on average, reversals among winners 
occur only following extreme gains observed during 
after-hours periods. In addition, the trigger variable is 
significantly negative. The coefficient of –0.377 means 
that the reversal (loss) is, on average, about 38% of the 
previous extreme price variation, after controlling for other 
variables. The SECTDUM variable is significantly negative 
at the 10% level, which indicates that the reversal tends to 
be stronger for sector ETF winners. This result confirms 
the previous comparisons of reversals among the three 
ETF types. The TAXDUM variable is also significantly 
negative, signaling the existence of relevant tax effects. 
The year dummies show that there are significant positive 
unobservable time-specific effects, which suggest that 
there is a general trend towards less pronounced reversals 
following positive extreme returns.
An analogous multivariate analysis was employed to 
examine the full sample of losers. The AFTERHOURS binary 
variable is significantly positive, indicating that the reversal 
following an after-hours loser is stronger than the reversal 
after a normal hours loser. This finding corroborates earlier 
results. The TRIGGER variable is significantly negative 
with a coefficient of –0.112, suggesting that the reversal 
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(gain) is 11% of the previous extreme price variation. The 
SECTDUM variable is now positive and significant, which 
suggests that the reversal is more pronounced for sector 
ETF losers. The TAXDUM binary variable is significantly 
positive, indicating that the reversal tends to be stronger in 
the months of December and January. The ABN_VOLUME 
variable is significantly positive suggesting that the reversals 
tend to be more pronounced when accompanied by a 
higher volume of trading. The ABN_VOLATILITY binary 
variable is significantly negative, meaning that the reversal 
following extreme losses tends to be stronger when ETF 
prices are less volatile. The negative coefficients of the year 
dummies suggest that there is a general trend towards less 
pronounced reversals following negative extreme returns.
Table 8
Cross-sectional regression of AR after extreme price returns for the whole sample of ETFs
Winners Losers Normal hours After-hours
Constant
0.023*** -0.002 0.004** 0.007
(0.000) (0.445) (0.015) (0.480)
AFTERHOURS
-0.021*** 0.016***
(0.000) (0.000)
LOSDUM
0.000 -0.038***
(0.940) (0.009)
TRIGGER
-0.377*** -0.112*** 0.022* -0.458***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.064) (0.000)
INTLDUM
0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.136) (0.986) (0.212) (0.680)
SECTDUM
-0.001* 0.003*** 0.001** -0.001
(0.088) (0.000) (0.017) (0.447)
BULLDUM
-0.001 0.001 -0.002* 0.003*
(0.383) (0.289) (0.069) (0.083)
TAXDUM
-0.009*** 0.014*** 0.001* 0.003*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.063) (0.097)
ABN_VOLUME
-0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.443) (0.022) (0.817) (0.186)
ABN_VOLATILITY
0.002 -0.169*** 0.021 -0.005
(0.395) (0.000) (0.298) (0.304)
Year08
0.011*** -0.008*** -0.005*** 0.011**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.123) (0.277)
Year09
0.006*** -0.007*** -0.003** 0.008
(0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.038)
Year10
0.011*** -0.011*** -0.003** 0.011**
(0.003) (0.009) (0.047) (0.133)
Year11
0.016*** -0.015*** -0.004** 0.009*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.049)
Year12
0.012*** -0.013*** -0.003 0.009*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.087)
Year13
0.008*** -0.009*** -0.002 0.008
(0.000) (0.000) (0.133) (0.093)
Year14
0.014*** -0.017*** -0.003 0.006
(0.003) (0.007) (0.312) (0.158)
Observations 13,909 15,704 19,389 10,224
R-squared 0.102 0.042 0.003 0.142
F 54.35 42.57 4.666 62.33
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The dependent variable is the abnormal return (AR) following extreme price returns. AFTERHOURS is a binary variable 
with a value of 1 if the extreme return occurs after-hours and 0 otherwise. LOSDUM is a binary variable with a value of 1 if the 
extreme return is negative and 0 otherwise. TRIGGER is the extreme return of the ETF in the initial period. INTLDUM is a binary 
variable with a value of 1 if the ETF is an international fund and 0 otherwise. SECDTDUM is a binary variable with a value of 1 
if the ETF is a sector fund and 0 otherwise. BULLDUM is a binary variable with a value of 1 if the extreme return occurs during a 
bull market period and 0 otherwise. TAXDUM is a binary variable with a value of 1 if the extreme return occurs during December 
or January and 0 otherwise. ABN_VOLUME is the abnormal volume traded in the day where the extreme return occurs. ABN_
VOLATILITY is the abnormal standard deviation of returns observed over the past ninety days before the extreme return occurs. 
YEAR08, YEAR09, YEAR10, YEAR11, YEAR12, YEAR13 and YEAR14 are binary variables with a value of 1 if the extreme return 
occurs in the year 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 or 2014, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Robust p-value in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Short-term overreaction in equity ETFs following extreme one-day returns
364 R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 30, n. 81, p. 352-367, set./dez. 2019
Table 8 also shows the results when the multivariate 
analysis was conducted considering all the events where 
the extreme return occurred during normal hours. The 
TRIGGER variable is positive but only significant at the 
10% level. The coefficient of 0.022, indicates that, on 
average, we observe an after-hours continuation of 2.2% 
of the initial extreme price movement occurred during the 
normal hours period. This finding confirms our previous 
results. The SECTDUM variable is positive and significant 
at the 5% level, suggesting that the reversal tends to be 
more pronounced for sector ETFs. The year dummies 
show that there are significant negative time-specific 
effects in the years 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011.
The same model is estimated for all events where 
the extreme price variation occurred after-hours. Not 
surprisingly, the degree of reversal is very strong. The 
TRIGGER coefficient is now negative (-0.458) and highly 
significant, indicating a reversal of almost half (46%) 
of the initial extreme return. Again, the year dummies 
capture some positive time-specific effects.
Table 9 displays the results of additional cross-sectional 
analysis that were conducted for each ETF type. All 
regressions are globally significant with a 1% significance 
level. Results suggest that the determinants of abnormal 
returns in normal hours and after-hours vary with ETF 
type. Thus, the reversal of extreme returns observed during 
normal hours is significantly influenced by the signal of 
that extreme return in the case of international ETFs 
(Panel A), by time-specific effects in the case of sector 
ETFs (Panel B), and by the size of the trigger in the case 
of broad-based ETFs (Panel C).
Regarding the reaction to extreme returns occurred 
during after-hours periods, the reversal exists in every ETF 
type under analysis. In percentage of the initial trigger, 
the reversal is 57% in the case of international ETFs, 34% 
for sector ETFs and 63% in the case of broad-based ETFs. 
The reversal of international ETFs and broad-based ETFs 
is less pronounced when the initial trigger is negative. In 
addition, the reversal of extreme returns observed during 
after-hours is significantly influenced by tax effects in the 
case of international ETFs (Panel A), by the current stock 
market trend in the case of sector ETFs (Panel B), and 
by the volatility in ETF prices in the case of broad-based 
ETFs (Panel C).
For the sample of international ETF winners (Panel 
A), the AFTERHOURS binary variable is significantly 
negative, which means that the reversal (loss) tends to be 
more pronounced for after-hours winners than normal 
hours winners. The TRIGGER variable is significantly 
negative, which implies larger reversals in reaction to 
larger triggers. The TAXDUM variable is also significantly 
negative, which means that the reversal tends to be 
more pronounced in December and January. The ABN_
VOLATILITY variable is significantly positive, implying 
that the reversal is larger when the ETF is less volatile.
For the sample of international ETF losers, the 
AFTERHOURS binary variable is significantly positive, 
indicating that the reversal (gain) after after-hours losers 
is more pronounced than for normal hours losers. The 
TRIGGER variable is significantly negative, which 
suggests larger reversals in reaction to larger triggers. 
Tax effects seem to play a role in international ETF 
losers as the positive and significant value of TAXDUM 
suggests that reversals are larger during December and 
January. The ABN_VOLATILITY variable is significantly 
negative, which indicates again that the reversal is 
stronger when the ETF volatility is lower. There seem 
to be some significant negative time-specific effects in 
the last years of the sample.
For the sector ETF winners (Panel B), the 
AFTERHOURS, TRIGGER and TAXDUM variables 
exert an effect that goes in the same direction as the one 
previously described for the international ETF winners. 
However, in the case of the sector ETF winners, there are 
positive time-specific effects in all the years of the sample, 
except 2013. For sector ETF losers, the AFTERHOURS, 
TAXDUM and ABN_VOLATILITY variables have a 
similar effect to the one previously described for the 
international ETF winners. In addition, there are 
significant negative time-specific effects in the years 2011 
and 2014.
For the broad-based ETF winners (Panel C), the 
AFTERHOURS, TRIGGER, TAXDUM and ABN_
VOLATILITY variables exert an effect that goes in the 
same direction as the one previously described for the 
international ETF winners. Additionally, the ABN_
VOLUME variable is significantly negative, which 
indicates that larger reversals tend to coincide with periods 
of higher trading volume. Significant time-specific effects 
continue to be found. For the sample of broad-based ETF 
losers, AFTERHOURS and TAXDUM are positive and 
significant, which is consistent with the results obtained 
for other subsamples of loser ETFs. Moreover, TRIGGER 
and ABN_VOLATILITY are significantly negative, which 
is consistent with the results observed for international 
loser ETFs. Significant time-specific effects continue to 
be present.
Although abnormal returns seem to be sensitive to 
different cross-sectional features in the case of each ETF 
type, some general conclusions can be provided. First, the 
reversal tends to be stronger in reaction to the extreme 
price variations that happen after-hours than those that 
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occur during normal hours. Second, the magnitude of 
the reversal tends to be conditional on the size of the 
trigger, which entails greater overreaction for specific ETFs 
with more extreme price variations. Third, the reversal 
is stronger during the months of December and January, 
suggesting the presence of relevant tax effects. Fourth, 
the reversal is usually stronger when the ETF price is less 
volatile than usual.
Table 9
Cross-sectional regressions of abnormal returns by ETF type after extreme price movements
Panel A - International ETF Panel B - Sector ETF Panel C - Broad-Based ETF
Normal 
hours
After-
hours
Winners Losers
Normal 
hours
After-
hours
Winners Losers
Normal 
hours
After-
hours
Winners Losers
Constant
0.003 0.030*** 0.025*** -0.003 0.011*** -0.019 0.023*** -0.001 -0.002 0.037*** 0.023*** -0.002
(0.372) (0.002) (0.002) (0.662) (0.000) (0.183) (0.000) (0.820) (0.458) (0.000) (0.000) (0.658)
AFTERHOURS
-0.008*** 0.006*** -0.027*** 0.020*** -0.022*** 0.019***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LOSDUM
0.009** -0.067*** -0.003 -0.008 0.001 -0.063***
(0.019) (0.000) (0.202) (0.675) (0.750) (0.000)
TRIGGER
0.042 -0.567*** -0.414*** -0.197** -0.004 -0.339** -0.371*** -0.072 0.053*** -0.632*** -0.399*** -0.160***
(0.122) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.843) (0.012) (0.000) (0.106) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BULLDUM
-0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.005* -0.002 0.009** 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000
(0.255) (0.425) (0.177) (0.067) (0.235) (0.014) (0.870) (0.448) (0.407) (0.752) (0.305) (0.984)
TAXDUM
0.001 0.007*** -0.012*** 0.016*** 0.001 0.004 -0.008*** 0.013*** 0.002** -0.001 -0.013*** 0.017***
(0.519) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.522) (0.165) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.865) (0.000) (0.000)
ABN_
VOLUME
0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000
(0.335) (0.210) (0.071) (0.151) (0.805) (0.068) (0.106) (0.703) (0.544) (0.197) (0.004) (0.186)
ABN_
VOLATILITY
0.007 -0.187* 0.264*** -0.287*** 0.024 -0.003 -0.001 -0.085** 0.030 -0.468*** 0.191*** -0.270***
(0.930) (0.072) (0.002) (0.001) (0.386) (0.253) (0.450) (0.034) (0.368) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year08
-0.008*** 0.006 0.003 -0.007 -0.009*** 0.020** 0.011*** -0.006 0.002 0.001 0.011*** -0.012**
(0.421) (0.967) (0.050) (0.001) (0.003) (0.736) (0.005) (0.000) (0.563) (0.609) (0.000) (0.012)
Year09
-0.005* -0.003 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007*** 0.021*** 0.008** -0.004 0.003 -0.007 0.008** -0.012**
(0.009) (0.444) (0.579) (0.160) (0.000) (0.011) (0.001) (0.103) (0.599) (0.935) (0.000) (0.031)
Year10
-0.006* 0.001 0.011* -0.017*** -0.007*** 0.024*** 0.007** -0.003 0.002 -0.008 0.011*** -0.015***
(0.083) (0.745) (0.338) (0.136) (0.000) (0.008) (0.015) (0.313) (0.358) (0.331) (0.017) (0.021)
Year11
-0.005 0.003 0.012* -0.017*** -0.009*** 0.017** 0.013*** -0.013*** 0.004 -0.003 0.017*** -0.017***
(0.071) (0.874) (0.070) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.028) (0.400) (0.535) (0.279) (0.001) (0.009)
Year12
-0.006 -0.001 0.010 -0.020*** -0.006** 0.017* 0.008** -0.005 0.002 -0.007 0.019*** -0.020***
(0.132) (0.739) (0.051) (0.001) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.001) (0.283) (0.665) (0.000) (0.004)
Year13
-0.003 0.002 0.010 -0.016*** -0.006*** 0.007 0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004 -0.002
(0.211) (0.921) (0.121) (0.000) (0.011) (0.056) (0.030) (0.342) (0.585) (0.322) (0.000) (0.006)
Year14
-0.005 -0.000 0.013** -0.020*** -0.007*** 0.003 0.011*** -0.016*** 0.002 -0.004 0.015*** -0.017**
(0.453) (0.820) (0.106) (0.004) (0.009) (0.440) (0.460) (0.219) (0.432) (0.607) (0.328) (0.787)
Observations 3,410 3,712 3,263 3,859 9,198 3,771 6,097 6,872 6,781 2,741 4,549 4,973
R-squared 0.003 0.132 0.077 0.037 0.003 0.141 0.114 0.046 0.013 0.209 0.128 0.060
F 1.596 14.47 10.18 11.29 3.571 42.97 35.74 22.18 6.753 30.01 26.31 20.64
Prob>F 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: The dependent variable is the abnormal return (AR) following extreme price returns. AFTERHOURS is a binary variable 
with a value of 1 if the extreme return occurs after-hours and 0 otherwise. LOSDUM is a binary variable with a value of 1 if the 
extreme return is negative and 0 otherwise. TRIGGER is the extreme return of the ETF in the initial period. BULLDUM is a binary 
variable with a value of 1 if the extreme return occurs during a bull market period and 0 otherwise. TAXDUM is a binary variable 
with a value of 1 if the extreme return occurs during December or January and 0 otherwise. ABN_VOLUME is the abnormal 
volume traded in the day where the extreme return occurs. ABN_VOLATILITY is the abnormal standard deviation of returns 
observed over the past ninety days before the extreme return occurs. YEAR08, YEAR09, YEAR10, YEAR11, YEAR12, YEAR13 and 
YEAR14 are binary variables with a value of 1 if the extreme return occurs in the year 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 or 
2014, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Robust p-value in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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5. CONCLUSION
ETFs hold a fixed basket of stocks, similar to a mutual 
fund, but they may be traded throughout the day at prices 
determined by the market on a stock exchange. ETFs 
provide an easy way for less informed investors to assume 
positions in stock composites, which could imply the 
formation of more volatile prices in the market.
Our paper examines the response to the variations 
in the share price of ETFs that happen within either 
normal trading hours and after-hours (at least 5% in 
either direction). Based on an analysis of 36,962 extreme 
price variations of US ETFs in the 2007-2014 period, 
we documented a stark contrast between what occurs 
in normal hours and after-hours. We show that there 
is a much stronger reversal of extreme price variations 
that occur after-hours. In fact, on average only extreme 
returns that happen after-hours tend to be reversed in the 
following period. This result lends credit to the notion 
that normal and after-hours periods may be regarded 
as two separate markets and corroborates the literature 
suggesting that markets during after-hours tend to be more 
inefficient (e.g., Barclay & Hendershot 2003; Berkman 
et al. 2012).
The existence of a significant overreaction in 
ETF prices is somewhat surprising, given that these 
instruments offer most advantages of a future contract 
such as liquidity and competitive pricing. They can 
be purchased on margin and sold short. Moreover, 
unlike most mutual funds, each ETF has a very specific 
investment objective, such as replicating a country’s 
stock index or an industry sector. Because ETFs have 
clearly defined objectives and are easy to trade, their 
prices should, in theory, closely follow fundamentals. 
Our results suggest that, in spite of these favorable 
characteristics, noise traders can significantly influence 
the short-term evolution of ETF prices. Other reasons 
such as changing risk premia or microstructure influences 
seem unlikely candidates to explain the reported patterns 
of short-term overreaction and reversal.
On the basis of multivariate analyses, we conclude 
that reversals are consistently stronger for ETFs that 
experienced more extreme price movements. Moreover, 
the reversal tends to be stronger during the months of 
December and January. This finding suggests that tax-
motivated trading is important to understand short-term 
price overreaction. So, one should take into account these 
effects in future research.
The reversal is found to be usually more pronounced 
when the ETF price is less volatile. This finding lends 
supports to the proposition that uninformed investors 
that are at the origin of the overreaction movement can 
also create abnormal volatility and noise trader risk that 
reduces arbitrage effectiveness in the short-term.
Our results have important implications for both 
regulator and market practitioners’ purposes. First, as 
regards regulation, our findings advise market regulators 
to concentrate their resources on the oversight of the 
ETF pricing that occurs after-hours. The existence of 
overreaction in prices imply that some investors trade too 
much; and consequently they bear unnecessary trading 
costs. These excessive trading costs are found to be very 
significant economically: according to some estimates 
stock market investors incur in losses that can reach 
between 0.7% and 2.2% of their respective national GDP, 
every year (French 2008; Barber et al., 2008). Regulators 
should be concerned with this loss of wealth also in the 
case of ETF markets. Second, for market practitioners, 
our findings suggest the existence of profitable market 
opportunities. During the sample period, for after-hours 
winners qualifying for the 5% minimum trigger, the mean 
reversal in the following period is -1.73%, while for after-
hours losers, there is a reversal of 1.41% on average (see 
table 2). Bid-ask spreads can be significant for ETFs that 
have low liquidity. However, it should be noted that in 
order to take advantage of the overreaction patterns 
detected in our paper, the investor would have to trade 
during normal hours, precisely the period in which the 
concern with the lack of liquidity is least justified. In fact, 
considering the relatively low costs of investing in liquid 
ETFs during normal hours and that the bid-ask spread 
on large capitalization US ETF lies typically between 
0.1% and 0.2% of share price (Golub et al., 2013), our 
results suggest that there is room to profit from the above 
mentioned pattern of overreaction and reversal at least 
in highly liquid ETFs.
Júlio Lobão & Ana Isabel Costa
367R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 30, n. 81, p. 352-367, set./dez. 2019
REFERENCES
Atkins, A., Dyl, E. 1990. Price Reversals, Bid-Ask Spreads, and 
Market Efficiency. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 25, 535–547.
Barber, B. M., Lee, Y., Liu, Y., Odean T. 2008. Just How Much Do 
Individual Investors Lose by Trading? Review of Financial 
Studies, 22, 609-632.
Barclay, M.J., Hendershott, T. 2003. Price Discovery and Trading 
After Hours. Review of Financial Studies, 16, 1041–1073.
Berkman, H., Koch, P., Tuttle, L., Zhang, Y. 2012. Paying Attention: 
Overnight Retums and the Hidden Cost of Buying at the Open. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 47, 715-741.
Bowman, R.G., Iverson, D. 1998. Short-run overreaction in the 
New Zealand stock market. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 6, 
475–491.
Bremer, M., Sweeney, R.J. 1991. The reversal of large stock-price 
decreases. Journal of Finance, 46, 747–754.
Bremer, M., Hiraki, T., Sweeney, R.J. 1997. Predictable patterns 
after large stock price changes on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32, 345–365.
Brown, S.J., Warner, J.B. 1980. Measuring Security Price 
Performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 8, 205-258.
Brown, K.C., Harlow, W.V., Tinic, S.M. 1993. The risk and 
required return of common stock following major price 
innovations. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
28, 101–116.
Caporale, G.M., Gil-Alana, L., Plastun, A. 2017. Short-Term 
Price Overreactions: Identification, Testing, Exploitation. 
Computational Economics, forthcoming, DOI: 10.1007/
s10614-017-9651-2.
Choi, H.S., Jayaraman, N. 2009. Is reversal of large stock-price 
declines caused by overreaction or information asymmetry: 
Evidence from stock and option markets. Journal of Futures 
Markets, 29, 348–376.
Cox, D.R., Peterson, D.R. 1994. Stock returns following large one-
day declines: Evidence on short-term reversals and longer-
term performance. Journal of Finance, 49, 255–267.
Davis, S., Madura, J., Marciniak, M. 2009. Performance and Risk 
among Types of Exchange-Traded Funds during the Financial 
Crisis. Journal of Derivatives, 1, 182-188.
De Bondt, W.F.M., Thaler, R.H. 1985. Does the Stock Market 
Overreact? Journal of Finance, 40, 793–805.
De Bondt, W.F.M., Thaler, R.H. 1987. Further Evidence on 
Investor Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality. Journal 
of Finance, 42, 557–581.
French, K. 2008. Presidential Address: The Cost of Active 
Investing. Journal of Finance, 63, 1537-1573.
Golub, B., Novick, B., Madhavan, A., Shapiro, I., Walters, K., 
Ferconi, M. 2013. Viewpoint: Exchange Traded Products: 
Overview, Benefits and Myths. BlackRock Investment 
Institute.
Levy, A., Lieberman, O. 2013. Overreaction of Country ETFs to 
US Market Returns: Intraday vs. Daily Horizons and the Role 
of Synchronized Trading. Journal of Banking and Finance, 37, 
1412-1421.
Lobe, S., Rieks, J. 2011. Short-term market overreaction on the 
Frankfurt stock exchange. Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance, 51, 113–123.
Madura, J., Richie, N. 2004. Overreaction of Exchange-Traded 
Funds during the Bubble of 1998-2002. Journal of Behavioral 
Finance, 5, 91-104.
Mazouz, K., Joseph, N.L., Joulmer, J. 2009. Stock price reaction 
following large one-day price changes: UK evidence. Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 33, 1481–1493.
Otchere, I., Chan, J. 2003. Short-term overreaction in the Hong 
Kong stock market: Can a contrarian trading strategy beat the 
market? Journal of Behavioral Finance, 4, 157–171.
Pagan, A.R., Sossounov, K.A.  2003. A Simple Framework 
for Analysing Bull and Bear Markets. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 13, 23-46.
Simon, D.P., Sternberg, J.S. 2005. Overreaction and Trading 
Strategies in European iShares. Journal of Alternative 
Investments (Summer), 29-41.
Spyrou, S., Kassimatis, K., Galariotis, E. 2007. Short-term 
overreaction, underreaction and efficient reaction: Evidence 
from the London Stock Exchange. Applied Financial 
Economics, 17, 221–235.
Stambaugh, R.F., Jianfeng, Y., Yuan, Y. 2012. The Short of It: 
Investor Sentiment and Anomalies. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 104, 288-302.
Tse, Y., Martinez, V. 2007. Price discovery and informational 
efficiency of international iShares funds. Global Finance 
Journal, 18, 1–15.
